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The neoclassical paradigm has proven to be a rich approach for evaluating a variety
of issues for individual and social decision-making. However, an increasing body of
literature suggests that actual behavior systematically violates the neoclassical utility
model. This paper reviews a number of alternative models for decision-making.
Results from the literature show several examples of apparently “irrational” behavior
that can be explained in terms of these alternative motivations. The paper also
extends the received literature by examining in some detail the implications of one
such model which is based on the psychological feeling of ambivalence. The paper
demonstrates that ambivalence has the potential for explaining the appearance of
intransitive choices, the use of rules of thumb in decision-making and the large
discrepancies between stated willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept, all of which
have been observed in various settings. There-are potentially great rewards from
innovative research that expands the neoclassical paradigm to incorporate additional
motivational factors in decision-making.
Introduction
The neoclassical models of utility maximiza-
tion and expected utility maximization have
proven to be rich models that are widely appli-
cable to a variety of individual and social
choice problems. The models are based on
simple and intuitively appealing axioms of be-
havior and have proven surprisingly powerful
for a variety of conceptual and empirical ap-
plications. They imply restrictions on behav-
ior that can be tested with empirical data and
provide insight into both individual choice and
social policy formation.
Despite the great success of the use of the
standard neoclassical models, economists
have no cause to become complacent. Recent
work by both economists and others have
found that behavior is systematically in-
consistent with the implications of these mod-
els. Given the normative appeal of the neo-
classical behavioral axioms, such violations
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might be viewed as evidence of “irrational”
behavior. However, the apparent persistence
of these violations has led some researchers to
seek a “rational” explanation for them, i.e. to
develop intuitively appealing alternatives to,
or generalizations of, the standard models that
actually predict and possibly explain these
violations.
It is our belief that these alternative be-
havioral models could play an important role
in applied economic analysis, not as sub-
stitutes for the neoclassical models but rather
as complements to them. We have learned
much from applications of the neoclassical
models, and they will undoubtedly continue to
provide insight into unsolved problems. How-
ever, there is clearly room for expanding the
paradigm to include additional factors, in
much the same way that expected utility
theory expanded the standard utility model to
include risk. The resulting models have the
potential to provide insights that are not
forthcoming from the utility or expected utility
models, such as explanations of behavior that
might otherwise appear “irrational.” Such in-
sights should enrich our understanding of pri-
vate decision-making and ultimately public
policy.82 October 1989 NJARE
This paper examines some of these issues in
two parts. First, we briefly outline three gen-
eral approaches to modeliing decision-making,
and in that context we discuss a few of the fac-
tors that might influence individual choices,
but are not included in the standard neoclas-
sical models. We do not attempt to provide a
comprehensive review of all alternative mod-
els since the literature on this topic is now
quite large and useful surveys exist elsewhere
(e.g. Machina; Shoemaker). Our hope is sim-
ply to introduce some of these kinds of mod-
elling efforts to those who are not familiar with
them and to encourage others in the profes-
sion to consider expanding their research to
include some of these concerns, where appro-
priate.
In the second part of the paper we speculate
on the implications of one alternative model
that has not received much attention thus far.
In particular, we explore the implications of
the psychological feeling of ambivalence
through an informal examination of its im-
plications for observable behavior and for
compensating welfare measures. Again, our
aim is to be suggestive, rather than com-
prehensive or rigorous.
Alternative Approaches for Modelling
Behavior
Complete behavioral models provide linkages
among three components of choice:
(1) underlying motivations for behavior
(2) decision rules for making choices and
(3) potentially observable behavior.
For example, Figure 1 depicts these three
components for the behavioral paradigm of
neoclassical theory. In terms of motivations,
neoclassical consumer theory assumes that
the consumers are motivated by desires de-
scribed by preference orderings, where these
preferences are defined over bundles of goods
and services consumed. Neoclassical pro-
ducer theory assumes that firms are motivated
by maximization of profits, as determined
by production technology and input/output
prices. The decision rules of neoclassical op-
timization are described by a set of first order
necessary conditions which equate marginal
benefits and marginal costs, subject to the
second order conditions. These decision rules
describe optimizing behavior and provide in-




















Figure 1. Depiction of General Framework
for Neoclassical Behavioral Modelling
making. Finally, observable behavior is a se-
ries of demand and supply functions on which
neoclassical theory imposes certain restric-
tions.
In examining alternatives to the neoclassical
behavioral models, one can start by specifying
an alternative underlying motivation; by
specifying alternative decision rules for ac-
tion; or by directly describing alternative rules
for observed behavior. Each of these ap-
proaches has advantages and disadvantages.
Specifying underlying motivations is the most
structural approach, in the sense that these
motivations provide the origin of decision
rules and, ultimately, of observable behavior.
This general method of behavioral modelling
has been termed the consistent modelling
method (Weaver and Stefanou). It specifies a
complete and consistent framework for mod-
elling, starting with the underlying motivation
and tracing the implications through to actual
behavior.
Neoclassical theory is an example of a con-
sistent modelling approach. Indeed modern
duality theory is really a comprehensive state-
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motivations of utility/profit maximization (or
cost minimization) and observable demand/
supply functions. For example, Hotelling’s
Lemma provides a tie between the un-
observed indirect profit function and poten-
tially estimable input demand functions. Sim-
ilarly, the approach suggested by Hausman
provides a tie between potentially observable
demand functions and the expenditure func-
tion. Thus, a link is provided between po-
tentially observable market behavior and the
underlying motivations of the firm and con-
sumer. This duality framework also places
constraints on behavior, such as upward-
sloping output supply functions, downward-
sloping input demand functions, and symmet-
ric, negative semi-definite Hicksian price
effects. These duality relationships have been
widely exploited in both theoretical and em-
pirical work.
One difficulty of the consistent modelling
approach is that the resultant structure is inca-
pable of describing the full richness of actual
behavior. Instead, the consistent modelling
approach identifies a critical motivation for
decision-making and traces out the logic of the
resultant model. In many cases where little in-
formation is available, a less structured and
restrictive approach based on general
observations of behavior may be useful, as
emphasized by Weaver and Stefanou. Fur-
thermore, there is generally no conclusive
way of verifying the appropriateness of an
hypothesized motivation from observable be-
havior because there is not necessarily a
unique correspondence between underlying
motivations and decision rules or observable
behavior. However, partial validation can be
carried out when certain types of behavior are
identified that are consistent with some un-
derlying motivation. Thus, although a particu-
lar hypothesized motivation cannot generally
be positively validated, it may be invalidated
as being incompatible with a particular
observed behavior.
The second approach to behavioral model-
ling is to start by specifying some particular
set of decision rules, such as optimizing rules,
satisficing rules, rules of thumb or
lexicographic rules. One can then determine
the set of observable behavior that is implied
by such a decision rule. Decision rules are
neither motivations for behavior, nor actual
behavior itself, but rather they are a means of
linking the two-that is they are a means of
translating motivations into behavior. Deci-
sion rules could be precise, formal means of
implementing these motivations or could
merely be a convenient ‘philosophy’ for mak-
ing choices. In addition, the decision rule may
bean actual rule used by an individual making
choices or can be an ‘as if’ rule, where poten-
tially observable behavior that is consistent
with the underlying motivations and the deci-
sion environment can be viewed ‘as if’ the de-
cision-maker were following some particular
rule. Further, decision rules may be equiva-
lent to or formal restatements of the underly-
ing motivation or can be a convenient means
of implementing a particular motivation in
making otherwise complex decisions in an un-
certain environment.
Basing behavioral modelling on decision
rules can be very useful for predicting
observed behavior, but can lead to difficulties
for welfare measurement and social policy
analysis. That is, because this approach does
not necessarily specify an underlying value or
objective function, it may not allow one to
define a welfare measure to use in judging
alternative outcomes. Thus, this approach is
necessarily restrictive in term of its ultimate
use in policy analysis.
The third approach is to start by specifying
rules for observed behavior. This approach
can be very useful for predicting behavior as it
is capable of integrating broad observations on
actual choices. Thus, such a specification does
not necessarily restrict behavioral modelling
to the extent that the consistent modelling
approach may. This approach can also be ex-
pected to result in estimates that are likely to
be consistent with and perhaps be a good pre-
dictor of observed behavior. Furthermore,
one need not understand why individuals be-
have as they do in order to use this approach
to describe or predict behavior. Nevertheless,
taking stock of observed behavior can be a
useful method for the initial specification of
hypothesized motivations. By carefully exam-
ining observed behavior we can consider the
dimensions of the behavioral modelling
problem that underlying motivations need to
explain. Indeed, behavior in various ex-
perimental environments has led to many of
the observed violations of utility theory that
have been the driving force behind the devel-
opment of many of the alternative behavioral
models discussed below. As with the second
approach, however, this approach can also re-
sult in potential difficulties for social welfare
measurement, as it does not generally imply a84 Oclober 1989 NJARE
unique underlying value function.
In the literature on alternative paradigms,
examples of each of these three modelling
approaches can be found. Since we are in-
terested in the “roots of ‘irrational’ behav-
ior, ” out primary focus in the remainder of the
paper will be on the first approach, namely
starting from underlying motivations for
decision-making. It should be clear from the
following discussion, however, that the dis-
tinction between motivations, decision rules
and behavioral implications may sometimes
be blurred. Nonetheless, we feel that those
factors that we have termed “motivations”
below satisfy the spirit, if not the letter, of the
categorization of modelling approaches that
we have just outlined.
Motivating Factors
All economic theories of behavioral motiva-
tion either implicitly or explicitly embody
assumptions regarding the factors that in-
fluence choice. These factors represent the
psychological considerations involved in mak-
ing a decision and provide the motivation for
choosing one feasible alternative over an-
other.
As noted above, in neoclassical consumer
theory under certainty, the factors influencing
choice are the quantities of goods and services
consumed and the individual’s preferences
over alternative combinations of those quan-
tities. Utility depends only on these factors.
Given two potential bundles of goods and ser-
vices to be consumed, bundles A and B, the
individual is assumed to prefer A over B, to
prefer B over A, or to be indifferent between
the two. These preferences are assumed to be
complete, reflexive, continuous and transi-
tive.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility theory is similar but incorporates risk.
Under this model, the factors influencing
choice are the quantities of goods/services un-
der different states of the world, the (objec-
tive) probabilities of those states occurring,
and the individual’s preferences over the
lotteries represented by the alternative com-
binations of quantities and probabilities.
Subjective Probabilities
One of the earliest modifications of the ex-
pected utility model was the inclusion of sub-
jective, rather than objective, probabilities for
different states of the world (e.g. Ramsey;
Savage). It was recognized that in many cases
decision-makers are unlikely to know the true
(objective) probabilities and will thus base
their decisions on their subjective beliefs
about those probabilities.
Although decisions being motivated by sub-
jective rather than objective probabilities is a
minor conceptual change, it can result in fairly
complex and important changes in behavior
when it is recognized that information and
processing power of individuals are imperfect.
People are often argued to have particular dif-
ficulty estimating the probability of rare
events. One reason is that within the in-
dividual’s experience there is not sufficient in-
formation to provide exact estimates of these
events, precisely because they are so rare.
Alternatively, the individual may not be capa-
ble of perceiving or differentiating between
probabilities of, say, 10-6 and 10-9. Given an
inability to perceive of such small numbers, a
decision-maker may assume that the prob-
ability is zero, with the idea that they are
unrepresentative or unlikely occurrences.
Alternatively, when the individual is unable
to comprehend such small numbers, the in-
dividual may perceive of these probabilities as
an arbitrary small number, like 10-3.
Because of the lack of experience and the
difficulties inherent in preceiving low prob-
abilities, the information available to the per-
son is often argued to bias the perception of
the likelihood of the event. Current observa-
tions may be given too much weight (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1973). For example, an indi-
vidual who works in a dangerous job but never
personally observes an accident occurring
may underestimate the probability of an ac-
cident. Alternatively, media coverage of
events such as plane crashes may cause an
over-estimation of the probability of a crash
since the public is aware of all crashes but not
of all safe trips. Likewise, subjective es-
timates of the probability of groundwater con-
tamination from agricultural pesticides may be
strongly influenced by the number of reported
cases of contamination of which the individual
is aware. As a final example, the popularity of
purchasing lottery tickets may be explainable
in terms of people’s inability to comprehend
the true probabilityy of winning. Instead the
perception of the subjective probability may
be based on news accounts of ‘real’ people
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amples suggest that subjective probabilities
are closely tied to an individual’s experience
with or knowiedge of such events occurring.
On the other hand, the literature on “an-
choring” (Edwards, 1968) suggests that in
some cases too little weight may be given to
current observations, i.e. that individuals are
reluctant to modify their subjective probabili-
ties in light of new information (observations).
For example, individuals living in flood plains
have been known to rebuild houses destroyed
by a flood in exactly the same location. Hav-
ing experienced a flood, they do not revise up-
ward their subjective probability of a flood, as
suggested by Bayes rule. Rather they view the
flood as an “aberration” that won’t be re-
peated.
While the underlying process for estimating
subjecti~e probabilities is complex and not
well understood, it is clear that calculations
based on subjective probabilities can easily be
inaccurate or imprecise due to biases in the
available information and the inherent dif-
ficulty of carrying out complex calculations
based on limited information. Thus, a di-
vergence between objective and subjective
probabilities may explain some of the
observed violations of expected utility theory.
However, replacing objective probabilities
with subjective ones does not change the fun-
damental nature of the individual’s choice
problem. Choice would still be determined
solely by probabilities, final outcomes and
preferences over lotteries.
RegretlDisappoin tment
Some researchers have suggested that other
factors, such as psychological feelings of re-
gret or disappointment, may also be important
motivations for choice. Bell (1982) and
Loomes and Sugden have proposed models
that incorporate anticipated feelings of regret
or rejoicing that might be experienced when
an individual learns that his decision turned
out to be “wrong” or “right” in the sense of
yielding an unfavorable or a favorable out-
come ex post.
The fundamental assumption in regret
theory is that final utility depends not only on
what you get, but also on what you could have
gotten had you chosen an alternative action.
Thus, a catastrophe is compounded if the indi-
vidual could have chosen an action that would
have avoided the catastrophe. Similarly, the
individual may rejoice if the action results in
an outcome that would have been worse had
some other action been chosen. If such feei-
ings are anticipated, individuals would be ex-
pected to compare the outcomes resulting
from different decisions under a given state of
the world and use this information in their
decision-making process.
Suppose, for example, that there is un-
certairity about the health effects associated
with pesticide contamination of groundwater
and that a policy maker is contemplating a ban
on use of the pesticide. If the policy maker
chooses to ban it and then it turns out to be
highly toxic, ex post he would have made the
right decision. If the potential danger is re-
vealed ex post, the policy maker might experi-
ence an additional payoff (rejoicing) due to his
having made the correct choice, in addition to
the direct utility resulting from avoiding the
contamination, Alternatively, if he had chosen
not to ban the pesticide, then ex pos[ his deci-
sion would have been wrong, He could have
avoided the negative effects by choosing an
alternative action, the ban, but did not do so.
The responsibility y he bears (i.e. the regret he
feels for not having chosen the ban) might
make the outcome seem even worse than it
would have been if there were no choice by
the decision-maker that would have avoided
the problem. In this case, the contamination
incident occurs and, in addition, the policy
maker must accept the blame and guilt for
having ‘caused’ it by not choosing an action
that could have avoided the incident. If the
policy maker anticipates such feelings, they
can be expected to influence his decision
regarding the ban. In fact, it seems likely that
such feelings played a role in the recent ban on
importation of Chilean grapes that followed
the discovery of cyanide in two grapes. Sim-
ilarly, the recent Pan Am tragedy may have
been compounded by the fact that there had
been prior warning which was not fully
heeded.
The concept of regret/rejoicing reflects an
assumption that individuals judge an outcome
relative to the outcome that would have oc-
curred in that state of the world if a different
decision had been made, Alternatively, the
concept of disappointment (Bell, 1985) sug-
gests that actual outcomes are judged relative
to the expected outcome. For example, a
groundwater contamination level of x ppm
might be viewed differently depending upon
whether the level was expected to be higher or86 October 1989 NJARE
lower than x. Thus, expectations may in-
fluence the valuation of any given outcome.
The psychological feelings of regret and dis-
appointment both imply that utility depends
not only on the realized outcome, such as the
level of damages from contamination, but also
on how that outcome compares to some
alternative outcome, either one that would
have resulted from an alternative choice or
one that was expected. Thus, the realized out-
come is judged relatively rather than absolute-
ly. It is this feature that distinguishes these
models from the standard neoclassical models
and results in behavior that violates neoclas-
sical assumptions.
For example, under neoclassical utility
theory, choices are assumed to be transitive.
However, intransitive choices have been
observed in a variety of experiment contexts
(e.g. Edwards, 1954; May; Tversky). Transiv-
ity need not hold when the motivational
assumptions embodied in the neoclassical
model are relaxed. For example, Loomes and
Sugden have shown that anticipated feelings
of regret or rejoicing can lead to intransitive
pairwise preferences. Regret implies that pref-
erences are not independent of the choice set,
i.e. the set of options from which the decision-
maker can choose, since each option is evalu-
ated relative to the outcomes that would have
been obtained had any of the other options
been chosen. Thus, the evaluation of any
given option depends on the other options that
were available when the choice is made.
Under regret theory apparently intransitive
choices can be rational. Consider, for exam-
ple, the hypothetical situation where the indi-
vidual chooses option A from the choice set
{A, B, C} and chooses option B from the
choice set {A, B}. Under neoclassical theory,
these choices are irrational since they violate
the weak axiom of revealed preference. The
first decision is interpreted as the individual
revealing that A is preferred to B, while the
second decision is interpreted as revealing
that B is preferred to A. However, under re-
gret theory no such inconsistency is indicated
because ex posr feelings of regret imply that ex
post utility is determined by the entire choice
set, rather than just the bundle chosen. Thus,
the choice must be defined over the entire
choice set, and cannot be defined over a part
of the set. In the first choice described above
the individual merely reveals that, given a
choice between A, B and C, they would
choose bundle A, not necessarily that A is pre-
ferred to B. Suppose, for example, if the indi-
vidual chooses option A there is a chance that
great regret will be felt for not having chosen
option C under some possible state. On the
other hand, if the individual chooses option B
there may be much less regret for not having
chosen option C. Thus, when C is an alterna-
tive, the individual may choose B rather than
A. In this case the individual’s anticipated
feelings of regret for not having chosen option
C maybe the factor which results in the choice
of B rather than A. On the other hand, when C
is not in the choice set no regret would be felt
for not having chosen C and the individual
may choose A rather than B.
Anticipated regret or rejoicing might also be
an explanation for the observed disparity be-
tween willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willing-
ness-to-accept (WTA) measures of value.
Knetsch and Sinden have suggested that
decision-makers might view the reference
alternative (for example, “no policy change”
in the case of WTP and the “policy change” in
the case of WTA) as choiceness in the sense
that it is the position the individual starts from
rather than a position to which he explicitly
chose to move. If this is true, the individual
might not experience any regret or rejoicing
from staying at that position. This implies,
however, that anticipated regret/rejoice feel-
ings would differ in WTP and WTA scenarios,
since the choiceness reference alternative
would differ. Opaluch and Segerson have
shown that with this asymmetry in regret/
rejoicing, WTP and WTA measures of value
will generally differ in ways other than simply
through the income effect.
Reference Points
Further support for the hypothesis that in-
dividuals base decisions on relative rather
than absolute outcomes is provided by the evi-
dence suggesting the use of reference points
(Kahneman and Tversky; Markowitz; Simon;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). In making de-
cisions, individuals often identify a reference
point and judge possible outcomes relative to
that reference point. For example, if the refer-
ence or starting point in a discussion of
groundwater quality is that all wells in a given
area are uncontaminated, then contamination
of 5070 of the wells might be viewed as a
“loss.” Alternatively, if the reference point is
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finding that only 5070 of the wells are con-
taminated would be viewed as a “gain.” In
either case, the outcome is that 5070 of the
wells are contaminated, but it might be judged
differently with the different reference points.
Reference points would be a factor motivat-
ing behavior if the ‘utility’ of the individual is
based on changes from a reference point, In
this case, preference functions underlying
decision-making need to be defined in terms of
gains or losses (i.e. movements from the refer-
ence point) rather than realized outcomes (e.g.
the number of contaminated wells). Alterna-
tively, reference points could simply be a con-
venient way of implementing ‘true’ absolute
preferences in a complex world characterized
by uncertainty, as opposed to risk.
Reference points are also a possible expla-
nation for “framing” effects. Framing effects
arise when changes in the wording or descrip-
tion of the options alter the individual’s choice
(e.g. Slovic; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981),
possibly due changes in the individual’s refer-
ence point. For example, in a decision regard-
ing banning the use of a toxic substance, the
decision-maker may choose differently if the
policy choice is described as losing y lives in
order to save x dollars as opposed to describ-
ing it as spending x dollars to save y lives. By
stating the policy in the first way the decision-
maker might be induced to choose implicitly a
reference point of’ ‘zero exposure. ” He starts
from a position of zero lives lost and then con-
siders whether losing y lives is worth a savings
of x dollars. Alternatively, the reference point
is implicitly “high exposure” if the policy is
stated as spending x dollars to save y lives.
Here the decision-maker starts from a position
of zero lives saved and then considers whether
saving y lives is worth x dollars. This change
in the reference point or framing of the option
can lead to changes in the choice regarding
adoption of the policy.
Reference points are also another possible
explanation for the difference between WTP
and WTA measures noted above (Gregory).
WTP scenarios may elicit feelings about pay-
ment for a gain, while WTA measures might
capture required compensation for a loss. If
identical final wealth positions are viewed dif-
ferently depending upon whether they were
attained through a gain or a loss, as suggested
by the use of reference points. then the
observed disparity between WTP and WTA
measures of value could be considered ‘‘ra-
tional. ”
Complexity
Another factor that could influence the de-
cision-making process is the complexity of the
decision environment. Simon’s seminal work
on the bounds to rationality suggests that
limits on cognitive ability may prevent a de-
cision-maker from being able to (or wanting to
take the time to) perform the calculations nec-
essary to maximize the expected value of
some preference function, If a choice situation
involves many possible states of the world and
there is uncertainty about both the probabili-
ties of the different states occurring and the
possible outcomes under these states, then the
complexity of the choice problem may prevent
the decision-maker from considering all ‘brele-
vant” information. Instead, he may structure
his preferences Iexicographically, focusing on
a single characteristic of the problem as the
main determinant of choice, with some prior-
ity sequence on the various characteristics.
Alternatively, if the probabilities of out-
comes or the outcomes themselves are highly
complex, uncertain and/or subject to large
errors, then rather than trying to use very im-
perfect information to balance possible costs
and benefits, a decision-maker may instead
choose to rely on the use of a rule of thumb.
For example, rather than trying to weigh costs
and benefits from the reduction of each toxic
substance individually, policy makers may in-
stead set a single “acceptable” risk level to be
applied to several or all substances even
though the costs and benefits associated with
that risk would vary across substances. The
implications of using rules of thumb are dis-
cussed in more detail below.
Ambivalence
A key feature of the neoclassical paradigm is
the assumption that the decision-maker has
the ability to rank options unambiguously.
Given a choice between bundles A and B, the
neoclassical model assumes that either A is
preferred to B, B is preferred to A or the indi-
vidual is indifferent between A and B. This,
however, ignores a potentially important psy-
chological feeling, that of ambivalence (Op-
aluch). Ambivalence arises when the individ-
ual faces strongly opposing feelings when
making a decision. In cases where the decision
is a difficult one to resolve, the decision-maker
faces a dilemma where the outcome cannot be88 October 1989 NJARE
correctly described as indifference. Indiffer-
ence suggests that the individual does not care
which alternative occurs. This implies a com-
placency in decision-making that is not an ap-
propriate description of the psychological de-
meanor for choice where the individual has
strongly opposing feelings for two options.
Rather, under extreme ambivalence the
choice embodies a deep psychological conflict
which must be resolved. Thus, rather than
making decisions according to a balancing of
costs and benefits. conflict resolution de-
termines the choices to be made and this may
result in behavior that violates neoclassical
assumptions.
Akerlof and Dickens did the first work bv .
economists that incorporated ambivalence in
decision-making. They examined the case of
individuals choosing dangerous jobs and
argued that psychological conflict arises be-
cause individuals must somehow reconcile the
fact that they choose to risk their lives at work
every day. Akerlof and Dickens argue that in-
dividuals will resolve this psychological con-
flict by modifying their beliefs to conform with
their choice of occupation. Thus, in order to
resolve the internal conflict, people in danger-
ous occupations may modify their subjective
probabilities of an accident so that they
choose to believe that their job is not danger-
ous. As Akerlof and Dickens demonstrate,
this implies people in dangerous jobs may not
take sufficient safety precautions since they
subsequently believe that their job is not as
dangerous as it really is. Further, if workers
resolve their internal conflict by choosing to
believe that their jobs are really safe, they will
not require compensating wage payments so
that hazards will not be internalized to the firm
nor will they tend to act through unions to de-
mand safer working conditions. Thus, the op-
timal level of precautions for accident avoid-
ance in the workplace will require regulations
on worker safetv. In contrast. the neoclassical
decision paradigm suggests that workers will
have the incentive to see that costs associated
with hazards at the workplace are internalized
to the firm.
The concept of ambivalence may be more
general and pervasive than the type of
problem discussed by Akerlof and Dickens.
Ambivalence can arise whenever an in-
dividual’s choice involves tradeoffs among
characteristics that cannot be easily com-
pared. Suppose, for example, that an individ-
ual has both tastes and values, where tastes
rank outcomes in terms of personal payoffs,
while values rank outcomes according to how
the individual believes that the world ‘ought’
to be. In this example, tastes relate to the
usual concept of individual preferences over
goods and services, while values relate to feel-
ings about such things as ethics and moral
principles. The usual concept of indifference
may not be appropriate for decisions concern-
ing tradeoffs between personal payoffs and
values, such as the amount of mone y one must
be paid to violate one’s moral principles.
Essentially, under ambivalence the de-
cision-maker has non-scalar preferences
which are based on two different objective
functions, one reflecting his social values and
the other reflecting his personal tastes, and the
individual is unable to make precise trade-offs
between these two. Hence, when values and
tastes clash, decisions may not be based on
the types of calculations implicit in the neo-
classical utility model and its generalizations.
Indeed, even the concept of making a decision
through trading moral values for personal re-
wards may be viewed as reprehensible and un-
acceptable social behavior. Thus, the balanc-
ing involved in neoclassical models cannot be
viewed as the basis of choice. It is possible
that in these circumstances that individual
switches into a different mode of decision-
making.
For example, to resolve the conflict one
might simply determine that values will not be
compromised for any amount of money. This
can lead to the use of decision rules based on
rules of thumb or a lexicographic ordering. To
avoid making comparisons between factors
that the decision-maker views as non-
comparable, such as dollars and deaths, he
may limit his choice set to those options that
do not require such a comparison to be made.
For example, setting the allowable level of a
cancer-causing substance at zero or at some
arbitrary level effectively rules out options
that require an explicit trade between lives
and dollars. By banning the use of a sub-
stance, the government eliminates the need to
decide whether the benefits obtained from that
use outweigh the costs or whether the in-
cremental benefits of an increase in use out-
weigh the incremental cost. Likewise, banning
the importation of Chilean grapes when two
were found to contain cyanide eliminated the
need to decide whether the reduction in the
risk of poisonings from other tainted grapes
was worth the cost of taking all grapes off theOpaluch and Segerson Rational Roo(s of ‘‘Irrational” Behavior 89
market.
When choices are based on rules of thumb,
due either to ambivalence or complexity, the
observed behavior may not directly reveal the
decision-maker’s underlying preferences, For
example, the behavior resulting from a
“safety first” rule would suggest that the
decision-maker is concerned only with safety
and not with monetary costs. If a lexico-
graphical ordering is used in the final choice,
the role of other factors may not be observed.
Since the decision-making criterion is de-
signed specifically to avoid the need to bal-
ance costs and benefits, we cannot use the
resulting observed behavior to infer the deci-
sion-makers preferences in making such a bal-
ance.
Thus, we must be careful in making in-
ferences about underlying preferences from
these limited observations on behavior. In
some cases where behavior is governed by
rules of thumb, the only way in which prefer-
ences are potentially revealed in observable
behavior is when the decision-maker changes
the rule of thumb to account for special cir-
cumstances of a particular decision. Suppose,
for example, that EPA sets standards for
groundwater contamination according to the
rule of thumb of one cancer case in a million.
Thus, the agency would set allowable con-
centrations for all pollutants, independent of
the associated costs, such that the expected
incidence of cancer would be one for each mil-
lion individuals who drink the water. In such a
case the agency does not reveal a unique mon-
etary value for avoiding cancer cases. How-
ever, there are invariably decisions that arise
where it is ‘unacceptably’ expensive to
achieve this standard. In such a case the agen-
cy would need to relax the constraints to allow
a higher concentration of the pollutant and an
associated higher cancer risk. For this exam-
ple the only observable trade-off between
money and lives is in determining what is ‘un-
acceptably’ expensive, hence requiring a
change in standards. Thus, any attempt at in-
ferring relative preferences of money versus
health risk for such a case would have to be
targeted at evaluating the cases where ex-
ceptions are made in using the rule of thumb.
Decision-Making Under Ambivalence
We now attempt to extend concepts of neo-
classical theory to decision-making under
ambivalence and speculate on possible differ-
ences in behavior that may result from
ambivalence. Consider the case discussed
above, where an individual faces two motiva-
tion functions, one for social values and one
for personal payoffs or tastes. Implicitly we
assume here that the individual is able to spec-
ify unique preference orderings on social val-
ues and on personal payoffs, but that the indi-
vidual cannot make precise tradeoffs between
values and tastes. Thus, there is no precise
scalar measure of ultimate preferences that in-
cludes both values and tastes.
While there is no single, precise measure of
preferences, the individual may have a limited
ability to make such trades. Thus, for exam-
ple, the individual might be willing to accept a
small compromise in values for a large per-
sonal payoff. The individual would clearly be
willing to tell a white lie for a million dollars.
On the other hand, the individual would likely
not accept a large compromise in values for a
small improvement in personal payoffs. The
individual would clearly not kill someone for
$5, even if the probability of being caught is
zero. Thus, the individual may be able to
make some comparisons between values and
tastes. However, there may be a large middle
ground where the individual may find that
decision-making is very difficult, possibly un-
certain and unreliable, and where indifference
is not an appropriate description of the in-
dividual’s psychological state. Rather, when
choosing among these strongly ambivalent
alternatives, the individual faces a state of
psychological conflict which must be resolved
in some manner,
The two alternative means for resolving the
psychological conflict resulting from ambiva-
lence that were discussed above are lexico-
graphical rules, such as not allowing values to
be compromised for tastes, or modifying be-
liefs such that decisions can be rationalized as
not being in conflict with values. Using these
two decision rules the decision-maker can
make trades between personal payoffs and
values, but these trades may be inconsistent
with neoclassical theory, as indicated above.
Consider the case depicted in Figure 2.
Here the individual starts at point I, with per-
sonal payoffs at level T and values at level V.
All alternatives to the Northeast of I, denoted
by set A, are clear improvements, as the situa-
tion leads to an improvement in terms of the
individual’s personal payoffs without com-










Figure 2. Depiction of Preference Ordering
with Fuzzy Ambivalence Region
Southwest, denoted by B, values are com-
promised without a countervailing improve-
ment in terms of personal payoffs, For points
to the southeast and the northwest the individ-
ual faces alternatives that force a comparison
between personal payoffs and values. For
some set such as C, little is lost in terms of
personal payoffs, while substantial im-
provements are forthcoming in terms of the
value ordering. Similarly for set D, little is lost
in terms of the value ordering but substantial
improvements are made in terms of personal
payoffs. As depicted in the figure, the individ-
ual prefers points within regions C and D to
the initial point, I, and hence views these
alternatives as desirable trades. In contrast, E
and F represent the sets where much is lost for
little gain, so that the individual prefers point I
to points within these regions, and they are
viewed as clearly unacceptable trades. Final-
ly, the shaded areas, H and G, represent the
‘fuzzy’ ambivalence sets where changes in
personal payoffs and values are in conflict and
where the individual finds decision-making
difficult. Similar to cases of complexity, the
individual may have limits to ‘rational,’ con-
sistent decision-making within the ambiva-
lence range simply because the individual is
incapable of making precise tradeoffs within
this region. Nevertheless, individuals are
sometimes forced to choose among such
points and it is in making these kinds of
choices that we have speculated individuals
may make decisions according to lexicograph-
ic rules or rationalization.
Discrete choice modelling maybe useful for
predicting behavior within the ambivalence re-
gion or for characterizing the region itself.
Ignore for the moment all sources of random-
ness in decision-making except for that arising
from ambivalence. Because decision-making
is uncertain within the ambivalence region,
the region that is ambivalent to point I in
Figure 2 may be defined as the region where
the probability of accepting a trade is greater
than zero but less than one. Although behav-
ior may not be completely predictable within
the ambivalence region, one might expect the
probability of accepting an ambivalent trade to
be a function of where the alternative lies
within the ambivalent region. That is, as one
moves within the ambivalence zone from the
boundary of region F, which contains points
which are clearly inferior to I, to the boundary
of region D, which contains points which are
clearly superior to I, the probability of accept-
ing the trade will likely increase from zero to
one.
At one extreme, as ambivalence becomes
more difficult to resolve, the ambivalence set
expands. In the limit as tradeoffs between
preferences and values become impossible the
ambivalence set fills the entire Northwest and
Southeast quadrants as shown in Figure 3. As
ambivalence becomes easier to resolve the
ambivalence set becomes sharper and nar-
rower until it collapses to a curve similar to
the indifference curve of ordinary utility
theory, as depicted by U in Figure 4. Im-
plicitly economists assume that individuals are
always able to resolve ambivalence in this pre-




















Figure 3. Ambivalence Region Expands to Fill



















Figure 4. Ambivalence Set Collapses to
Ambivalence Curve
spans a continuous range, from complete con-
gruity, where the individual is able to establish
precise trades of values and tastes, to com-
plete incongruity where the individual is un-
able to make any comparison between values
and tastes. Complete congruity can be han-
dled using ordinary economic methods, such
as state dependent utility functions, but under
incomplete congruity neoclassical assump-
tions can be violated. This kind of decision-
making is likely unreliable, inconsistent over
time and possibly irreversible.
Consider the Akerlof and Dickens example,
where individuals change their beliefs in order
to rationalize the decision to accept a trade be-
tween dollars and risk of death. Under neo-
classical theory, the individual would accept
the job if the pay is high enough to compensate
for the risk of death. The individual would
then act to reduce or avoid the risk. However,
if individuals instead choose to change their
beliefs to rationalize the choice, a number of
‘anomalies’ in decision-making may occur.
Once their beliefs are changed, individuals
will act according to these new beliefs, even if
it is potentially detrimental. For example,
even if risk reduction is ‘inexpensive,’ in-
dividuals may not act to reduce the risk since
they no longer believe that the job is risky.
Further, the decision will not be perfectly re-
versible, so that if the comparative wage dif-
ferential for the risky occupation is eroded
over time, the individual will likely not reverse
the occupational decision, since the in-
dividual’s perception is now that the job is not
dangerous.
Individuals who experience ambivalence
may also exhibit apparently intmnsitive
choices. As an example, consider the case
shown in Figure 5. Here, the individual clearly
prefers bundle J to bundle I. However, bundle
K is ambivalent to both I and J. Thus, in
choosing between bundles J and K, the indi-
vidual is ambivalent and may choose either
bundle so that the individual may be observed
choosing bundle K over bundle J. At some
other point in time, making the ambivalent de-
cision bet ween bundles K and 1, the individual
may choose bundle 1. Thus, in making two
ambivalent decisions, the individual may end
up choosing the inferior bundle, I when an
alternative set of decisions could have led to
the choice of bundle J. Given a direct choice
between bundles I and J, however, the indi-
vidual would clearly choose J, Under the
neoclassical paradigm, these choices would be
viewed as irrational since they are in-
transitive.
Ambivalence is also a possible explanation
for the observed disparity between WTP and
WTA measures of value. To see this we must
first derive money measures of compensation
under ambivalence. It is relatively straightfor-
ward using ordinary economic methods to
provide a money measure of compensation for
changes in tastes when values are held con-
stant, The non-trivial problem is determining
compensation for changes in values. How-
ever, given the ability to convert changes in





Figure 5. Depiction of ‘Intransitive’ Prefer-
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Figure 6. Depiction of Range for Compensa-
tion Under Ambivalence
compensation for changes in values in terms
of ordering for tastes. That is, if we can find
the increase in the ordering for tastes that is
required to compensate for a change in values,
this is asumed to be translated into a money
measure using the usual techniques.
Assume that the individual starts with bun-
dle I, as depicted in Figure 6, which has taste
ranking T and value ranking V. Suppose that
values are reduced to V‘ and we wish to com-
pensate the individual with personal payoffs.
The level of personal payoff required to com-
pensate is at least (T’ – T) since otherwise the
individual will be in region F which is un-
ambiguously inferior to bundle I. Compensa-
tion by more than (T – T), on the other hand,
will bring the individual to region D, which is
superior to the initial bundle, Compensation
within the range [(T’ – T), (T – T)] will
leave the individual within the ambivalence re-
gion, where the individual is neither un-
ambiguously better off nor worse off than at
the initial point, 1. As the ambivalence region
collapses to the two dimensional ambivalence
curve depicted in the diagram, the range of
compensation collapses to the relatively
straightforward scalar measure (T* – T). In
contrast, as the ambivalence region expands
to fill the NW and SE quadrants, the range of
compensation expands to [0, CQ]and com-
pensation becomes meaningless.
Thus, compensation is generally not a
unique amount which achieves indifference,
as defined under neoclassical utility theory.
Rather it is a range over which the individual
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is unsure and full of doubt. If individuals feel
ambivalence towards trades between two fac-
tors, then they will naturally feel uncomfort-
able with the idea of increasing the level of one
factor in compensation for losses in the other,
as the two factors are not precisely compara-
ble. Clearly, an individual facing such an am-
bivalent decision would find it very difficult to
respond precisely and consistently to willing-
ness-to-pay questions in a contingent valua-
tion survey and would feel uncomfortable with
the outcome in terms of providing appropriate
compensation. This is the same sort of un-
comfortable feeling that non-economists seem
to exhibit for the concept of estimating the
monetarv compensation for losses in manv
types of-enviro-nmental services.
Note that ambivalence does not imply that
no finite amount of money is enough to com-
pensate for losses in values, but rather that the
individual cannot make precise trade-offs be-
tween tastes and values, so that no unique
monetary compensation can be determined.
Further, within the imprecise range for com-
pensation the individual would feel unsure and
ambivalent, rather than being ‘made whole’ or
indifferent. In the case of complete incongru-
ity y, monetary compensation for losses in val-
ues is not a logical question, in the same way
that it does not make sense to ask the question
“How many pounds does the color red
weigh?” The two are non-comparable so that
they conform to different standards and are
subject to different measures.
In the case of partial congruity, the range
for compensation under ambivalence could be
the cause for some cases of observed di-
vergence between stated WTP and WTA in
contingent valuation studies, Faced with a
contingent valuation question that attempts to
elicit WTP or WTA for losses in values, the
individual would be unable to provide a pre-
cise response in the case where the ambiva-
lence region is a non-trivial but strict subset of
the SE and NW quadrants. Under such cir-
cumstances the individuals may behave con-
servatively when asked questions regarding
WTP and WTA. If so, when asked how much
they would be willing to pay to avoid a reduc-
tion in values, the individual may be unable to
determine a ‘true,’ precise maximum WTP,
but they may know that they would certainly
be willing to pay at least (T’ – T). When
asked how much compensation is required,
they again could not provide a precise answer.
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ly be adequately compensated by the amount
(T” – T). Thus, the inability to compare two
fundamentally incongruous options combined
with a conservative response to the questions
can lead to a large divergence in responses to
WTA versus WTP questions. This occurs be-
cause there does not exist a unique money
measure of indifference. Instead there is a
range for both WTP and WTA, and a ‘con-
servative’ response to questions might reflect
the opposite ends of this range for WTP versus
WTA.
Discrete choice models could also be ap-
plied to WTP for changes in values. The in-
dividual’s response to a once-and-for-all WTA
type question would be uncertain for bids in
the ambivalence region, i.e. bids between
(T’ – T) and (T – T). Again by ignoring any
source of randomness other than ambiva-
lence, the individual should respond positively
with probability Oif compensation is less than
(T’ - T) and positively with probability 1 if
compensation is greater than (T – T). How-
ever, within the range [(T’ – T), (T – T)]
one might speculate that the probability of a
positive response varies in some sense syste-
matically from Oto 1. Again, there would be a
small probability of a positive response to bids
near (T’ – T). In contrast, the probability of a
positive response would be near one for bids
near (T – T).
In searching for a unique value for com-
pensation one might be tempted to consider
measures that have been used in the context of
other discrete choice problems (Hanemann).
These include the ‘median’ bid where the
probability of a positive response is 50% and
the ‘mean’ bid which could be estimated by
multiplying the bid times the probability of a
positive response and integrating over the
range from (T’ – T) to (T – T). Note, how-
ever, these measures merely represent two
points that leave the individual within the
ambivalence region. Thus, it is questionable
whether there is any normative significance to
these measures in the context of ambivalence.
Returning to the general problem of de-
cision-making under ambivalence, we can rep-
resent the preference relations using the
following mathematical notation. Bundle I
represents the value-taste combination [VI,
TI], where V1represents the value ordering of
bundle I and TI represents the ordering of bun-
dle I in terms of tastes or personal payoffs.
Bundle J being preferred to I is denoted as
{J} > {I}, for which TJ > TJ and VJ > V1 are
sufficient, but possibly not necessary. For ex-
ample, a situation may be unambiguously pre-
ferred by the individual if TJ is greatly pre-
ferred to TI, while VJ is only slightly inferior to
V1 or if TJ is slightly inferior to TI and VJ is
greatly preferred to VI, as depicted above by
areas C and D in Figure 2. Indifference be-
tween I and J is denoted as {I} = {J}, where
TI = TJ and VI = VJ are sufficient for indif-
ference, but not necessary if the individual is
able to make at least some precise tradeoffs
between tastes and values. Finally, ambiva-
lence between I and J is denoted as {I}<> {J}.
Using this notation, the individual could face
bundles such that:
{J} > {I}, but {I}< > {K} and {K}< > {J}
so that the ambivalence operator is not strictly
transitive, as was depicted above in Figure 5.
Conclusions
Neoclassical theory has proven to be a rich
paradigm for understanding decision-making
within various types of environments. How-
ever, despite the great many successes of the
standard neoclassical models, an increasing
body of evidence has detected systematic
violations of the predictions of neoclassical
theory. These violations should not be viewed
as anomalies of behavior to be ignored or to be
explained away as irrational. Rather, this type
of behavior poses a challenge to extend the
neoclassical paradigm to incorporate other
aspects of decision-making in an attempt to
explain these results. In order to provide a
more comprehensive understanding of de-
cision-making, standard models need to be
modified to capture the essential components
of certain types of decision environments.
We do not mean to suggest that efforts to
expand the neoclassical paradigm would be
straightforward; on the contrary, this is quite a
difficult task, If we are to use the consistent
modelling approach in order to explain fully
the decision process, we must begin with the
underlying motivations for choice and use
them to derive a theory of behavior. If the
decision-making process is more complicated
than implied by neoclassical theory, then the
resulting models of that behavior will be more
complicated as well. Even if individuals take
steps to simplify decision-making, for example
by using rules of thumb, predicting how those
simplifications are made or when an individual94 October 1989 NJARE
will switch into that mode of decision-making
may be a difficult empirical task. Richer be-
havioral theories will also tend to complicate
the interpretation of observable behavior for
the purpose of inferring preferences from be-
havior. Finally, verification of the theory is
complicated by the absence of a unique corre-
spondence between motivations and behavior.
Despite these difficulties further work in
this area has the potential for tremendous
payoffs in explaining behavior that is in-
consistent with neoclassical theory. We have
discussed possible “rational” explanations for
some of this apparently irrational behavior.
For example, intransitive choices can arise
when decision-makers experience regret or
rejoicing in making choices (Loomes and
Sugden; Bell, 1982). We suggested here that
observed intransitivities might also arise from
ambivalence. Likewise, the use of rules of
thumb or lexicographical choice might be due
to complexity (Simon) or to ambivalence.
Finally, the observed disparity between will-
ingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept mea-
sures of value can be explained by feelings of
regret/rejoicing and the use of reference points
(Opaluch and Segerson; Gregory). As sug-
gested here, a third possible explanation is
ambivalence.
Given the number of possible’ ‘rational” ex-
planations for observed phenomena, gener-
alizations of neoclassical theory may prove to
be a highly productive path for research.
Thus, rather than discounting “irrational” be-
havior, our time might be more productively
spent exploring when and how to expand upon
the neoclassical paradigm in order to explain
this behavior. The challenge is to strike a bal-
ance between having a paradigm that is richly
descriptive of observed behavior and having a
tractable approach for modelling that behav-
ior. Although the task before us is difficult, the
rewards to success are correspondingly great.
Through innovative research efforts in this
area, we have the potential to enrich our
thought process, our understanding of de-
cision-making and, ultimately, our paradigm
in order to encompass a broader spectrum of
human behavior.
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